

Does learning impact ambiguity aversion ?

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CENTRE NATIONAL
DE LA RECHERCHE
SCIENTIFIQUE

*Annual Conference of the Center for Economics and Econometrics,
Bogazici Univerisity*


Outline

- ▶ Introduction
 - ▶ Motivation
 - ▶ Background
- ▶ The experiment
- ▶ The Results
- ▶ Discussion


Motivation

Decisions from experience

- ▶ Most of the empirical results in decision science deal with “described risk”




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
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


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
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


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
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


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
Motivation

Decisions from experience

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Motivation

Experience can be:


- Time consuming and/or Costly



Motivation

Experience can be:

- Time consuming and/or Costly



Motivation

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- Scarce
 - ▶ New products
 - ▶ New trends

Motivation

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
- Scarce
 - ▶ New products
 - ▶ New trends

What about decisions from limited experience ?




Background

The Ellsberg's Paradox (1961)




Risk




Ambiguity


The Ellsberg's Paradox (1961)



The Ellsberg's Paradox (1961)




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



Ambiguity

The Ellsberg's Paradox (1961)



Risk



Ambiguity

Ambiguity aversion: dislike for imprecision/vagueness

Ambiguity and finance

Ambiguity attitudes have been found to contribute to several puzzles in finance

Market anomalies (Barberis and Thaler, 2003)


- ▶ Equity premium

Household behavior (Dimmock et al., 2015a, 2015b)

- ▶ Non participation
- ▶ Home bias
- ▶ Under diversification

A parallel between Described/Experienced decision making and Ellsberg (1961)

Abdellaoui et al. 2011




Risk

Ambiguity


Experienced risk as a source of ambiguity

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



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


Risk



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

A parallel between experience and ambiguity



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




24 Risk



Ambiguity


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Free draws


8 draws

25 Risk




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

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


Free draws

8 draws

4 draws

No experience




Ambiguity

A parallel between experience and ambiguity

“If all the information [...] were in the form of sample distributions,

*then **ambiguity** may be closely related, inversely,*

to the size of the sample“




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
Ellsberg, 1961

³⁰ Objective: (How) does learning impact ambiguity aversion ?

The experiment


The choice task

- Matching probabilities




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
The choice task

- Matching probabilities
 - Direct comparison between risk and ambiguity
 - Direct observation of ambiguity attitudes



The choice task


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$p^* < p$ Ambiguity aversion

$p^* > p$ Ambiguity seeking


The model



- Under Prospect theory

$$w_{risk}(p^*)u(x) = W_{Source}(p)u(x)$$

The model




- Under Prospect theory

$$w_{risk}(p^*)u(x) = W_{Source}(p)u(x)$$

- Estimations

- ▶ Parametric specifications of
 - ▶ utility
 - ▶ Weighting function: elevation, sensitivity
- ▶ Likelihood maximization




The Design

- Indifferences are captured with choice lists

Treatment	Risk	Unconstrained	8 draws	4 draws
CE	9		5 for utility	5 for utility
MP		7	7	7
		0.05 0.13 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.87 0.95		


- Outcomes ranged from 0 to 50€
- Treatment blocks were randomized
- Choice lists were randomized within each block

The Procedure

- ▶ 71 subjects from  **L. E. E. P.**
Laboratoire d'Economie Expérimentale de Paris
- ▶ Sessions lasted 1h on average
- ▶ Individual interviews
- ▶ 10€ of show up fee + random incentive system

Displays

Question 1 sur 2



Tirages :


Il vous reste encore 4 tirages

Test



Displays

Question 1 sur 2



Tirages :


Il vous reste encore 3 Tirages

Test



Displays

Question 1 sur 2



Tirages :

Il vous reste encore 3 tirages


Test



Displays


Question 1 sur 2

Situation A



Vider liste

Situation B



Tirages : 50€ 0€ 0€ 50€

Remarque que les premiers et derniers choix de la liste sont triviaux






The Results



Raw data analysis

Matching probabilities vs Unknown real probabilities




Free sampling


8 draws

4 draws

Matching probabilities vs Experienced frequencies



Matching probabilities vs Bayesian probabilities



The Results



Analysis under Prospect Theory

Decision weights and ambiguity levels

- ▶ Which probabilities are weighted ?
 - observed frequencies
 - bayesian probabilities



- ▶ Which decision weighting function offers the best fit ?
 - ▶ Prelec
 - ▶ Goldstein-Einhorn
 - ▶ Constant relative sensitivity
 - ▶ Linear function (insensitivity and pessimism indexes)

Estimations based on Observed frequencies



	GE	Prelec	CRS	Linear
LL	-8516.6	-8516.3	-8516.5	-7838.6



- Estimations based on Bayesian probabilities (uniform priors, updated from the observed sample)



	GE	Prelec	CRS	Linear
LL	-7722.6	-7726.8	-7730.1	-7838.4

- ▶ Estimations based on Bayesian probabilities (uniform priors, updated from the observed sample)

Individual level estimations





Discussion

Main findings

About Ambiguity and Sampling:

- ▶ A **continuum of ambiguity degrees** between the known and the unknown urn
Sample size allows to manipulate ambiguity within a source
- ▶ For Ellsbergian ambiguity,
A relationship between **information and ambiguity**
- ▶ Ambiguity seeking towards rare events
- ▶ Decisions from unconstrained sampling remain ambiguous


Other findings

About Prospect Theory:


- ▶ Weighting functions capture attitudes in decisions from limited experience
- ▶ Regarding the estimation method
 - ▶ The different decision weighting specifications offer similar results and goodness of fit
- ▶ Sensitivity is the dimension that is the most impacted by ambiguity

Thank you for your attention.

Sampling Behaviors



The models



- Prospect theory (Wakker, 2010)

$$w_{risk}(p^*)u(x) = W_{Source}(p)u(x)$$

- Smooth model of ambiguity attitudes (KMM, 2005)

$$\Phi(p^*u(x)) = \int_M \Phi(pu(x)) dp$$

Experimenting on experienced risk

	Psychology <i>HBWE, 2004, 2006; Erev et al. 2010</i>	Decision theory Fox and Hadar, 2006; Abdellaoui et al, 2011
Findings	<i>Rare events are under weighted</i>	<i>Rare events may be under estimated, but are over weighted</i>
Paradigm	<i>Dynamic learning of probabilities and consequences</i>	<i>"Savagian" framework: Known state space</i>
Method	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- <i>Small stakes</i>- <i>Binary choices</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- <i>Larger stakes</i>- <i>Indifferences</i>

