

IS CORRUPTION A DRAWBACK TO TURKEY'S ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION?*

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The paper focuses on the question as to whether or not the current level of corruption in Turkey constitutes a major drawback for EU membership. After elaborating on the different types of corruption in Turkey, the paper argues that a full-scale anti-corruption strategy should include not only policing-type regulations and improved institutional structures, but also systemic reforms to deal with patron-client networking, informality and tax evasion. Assuming that the EU-anchor will continue to be important, the EU's impact on combating corruption in Turkey will be greater to the extent that the EU manages to better understand the full picture in Turkey with regard to corruption.

Keywords: Corruption, Turkey, EU-Accession, Informality, Patronage

Turkey's aspirations to become a full member of the European Union (EU) span over half a century (see, e.g., Grabbe 2003). Historically, matters surrounding democratisation, human rights and economic development have been instrumental in shaping how the EU-Turkey relationship has evolved. Yet this by no means implies that other issues were marginally important - corruption being one of them. Although fighting corruption has yet to be a point of contention in EU-Turkey negotiations, it may figure prominently in future talks with Brussels, especially when this relationship is placed between corruption and democracy. This raises two interrelated questions: whether or not the current level of corruption in Turkey constitutes a major drawback for EU membership; and how negotiations with the EU will affect corruption in Turkey. This paper aims to provide answers to these questions and, to this end, attempts to categorise the different types of corruption observed in the country.

Combating corruption assumed importance in EU-Turkey negotiations quite recently in fact, although this has seemingly largely been overlooked by the media, political actors and academia. After joining the European Council's Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) in January 2004, in a Council decision dated 23 January 2006, Turkey was advised to 'fully commit at all levels to the fight against corruption, including by strengthening all institutions involved, as well as coordination between

them' (European Council 2006). In line with this standpoint, the EU and the Council of Europe jointly funded a two-year project, effective from 1 December 2007, on 'Ethics for the Prevention of Corruption in Turkey', which aimed to, *inter alia*, support the implementation of the code of ethics across public administration and public officers, develop systems to monitor the effectiveness of prevention and other anti-corruption measures, and ensure and enhance the coordination of these measures. This project, despite its modest budget of 1.5 million Euros, should perhaps be considered a starting point of the EU's explicit involvement in Turkey's corruption problem.¹

Turkey's involvement in international treaties on anti-corruption is not limited to GRECO; the ratification of the UN Convention against Corruption (2006), the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (2003), the Civil Law Convention on Corruption (2003) and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (2000) are merely a few that stand out from a rather long list. In addition to efforts conducted at the international level, a series of serious, nationwide legal initiatives were also undertaken, especially in the last decade. Lately, the government has adopted the 2010-2014 strategy to develop preventive and repressive measures against corruption and enforce transparency and accountability. Prior actions included: the adoption of the 'Action Plan on Increasing Transparency and Enhancing Good Governance in the Public Sector' (2002), which sets out disciplinary and criminal sanctions against civil servants involved in corruption; the formulation of the 'Emergency Action Plan' (2003), which aims to strengthen specialised anti-corruption units; the establishment of the 'Financial Crimes Investigation Board at the Ministry of Finance' (1996); and modifications made to the Criminal Code to clarify the definition of corrupt activities (2005). Efforts by civil society to oversee the implementation of national anti-corruption strategies, however limited, should also be considered in this vein: in addition to the continued work by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) to raise awareness on corruption and search for anti-corruption policies, a number of private anti-corruption initiatives have also been influential, including Transparency International Turkey, the Association for Combating Corruption, the Association for the Protection of Citizens' Taxes, and the Economic Policy Research Institute (TEPAV).²

On the backdrop of this rather impressive palette of anti-corruption policy initiatives, the current level of corruption is strikingly alarming. The European Commission's *2010 Report on Turkey* makes a rather poignant remark, claiming that 'effective implementation of the strategy is necessary to reduce corruption *which remains prevalent in many areas*' (p. 17; italics added). Corruption seems to remain a serious concern for the people of Turkey - a fact that is quite observable in public opinion surveys. For instance, according to the *2010 Corruption Perceptions Index* prepared by Transparency International (2010a), the world-acknowledged authority on this issue, Turkey ranks 56th with a score of 4.4 (an index from 0 to 10, 10 corresponding to 'no corruption at all' and 0 to 'full corruption' in the public sector) - and has oscillated around that rank in the past few years. Similarly, findings from a recent nationwide survey conducted (in 2009) exclusively on this issue (Adaman *et al.* 2009) revealed that most layers of both central and local governments were perceived as being seriously corrupt: traffic police, customs, deeds offices, procurement offices, municipalities and construction offices all received scores of 6 or above, on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means 'no corruption at all' and 10 'full corruption'. These findings confirm Transparency International's (2010b) *2009 Global Corruption Barometer* study, which found the perceived corruption average for political parties, parliament/legislature, public officials/civil servants and the judiciary to be around 3.5 on a scale of 1 to 5 (where 1 corresponds to 'not at all corrupt' and 5 to 'extremely corrupt'). Moreover, in the private sector, where the current government has been trying to create an ambitious investment climate for national and international entrepreneurs, corruption was found to severely hinder investors: 42 percent of the companies surveyed in the *Enterprise Survey 2008* study by the World Bank and IFC (2008) identified corruption as a major constraint in doing business. This is reminiscent of findings from an earlier nationwide survey conducted with firms (Adaman *et al.* 2003), where 48 percent stated they had been forced to pay bribes or bring gifts to public officials/civil servants in the past two years in order to 'get things done'.

Furthermore, stylistic facts also corroborate this rather stark picture. The daily coverage of top-level officials (sometimes including prime ministers and ministers) facing corruption charges has become a fairly routine occurrence in the last decade.

More specifically, land administration has emerged as a speculative rent-making field especially in metropolises, and is prone to corruption. Global Integrity's (2010) *2008 Report* reveals that the Istanbul Greater Metropolitan Municipality has made more than 4,000 changes to city plans since 2004 - read as changes to building permits - igniting severe concern about corruptive practices. More recently, the fraud case filed in 2008 against the 'Deniz Feneri' charity in Germany, on the grounds that some of the donated monies were (illegally) transferred to AKP, is worth remembering. This brought about a corruption scandal which the Doğan Media Group pounced on, leading to a public feud between its owner, media tycoon Mr. Doğan, and Erdoğan (see, e.g., Global Integrity 2010).³ It should also be noted that similar cases were observed in previous coalition governments comprised of different political parties.

All in all, it appears that corruption has permeated all levels of government in Turkey - this despite the fact that recently successive governments ratified important international and EU conventions on anti-corruption as well as took relevant and imperative legal and administrative measures nationally. How are we to explain this rather unintended outcome? Are we to see the announcement of such anti-corruption efforts as nothing but whitewash - viz. as non-credible commitments - by the Turkish state machinery (elected members - central and local governments alike - as well as the bureaucracy) that is not genuinely willing to enforce the legal and administrative reforms adopted so far? Or, perhaps, the problem is not one of unwillingness but rather the inability of the state machinery, in the form of lack of capacity and capability. Could it be that, rather than engaging in comprehensive programmes, the state has been targeting only piecemeal programmes to fight corruption, and thus achieving only a little?

Positioned at this junction, this paper aims to explore the current situation described above and its implications for the two fundamental questions set out earlier. However, to arrive at an answer, it is vital to first begin by analysing and subsequently contextualising the different manifestations of corruption. Certainly, offering a police officer cash to dodge a fine when caught speeding should be categorised as bribery regardless of cultural or political context. However, lines of definition blur: for instance, when firms, in attempts to evade taxes - say, by employing informal labour - pay the 'necessary price' to avoid auditing in an

environment where this is known to be standard practice throughout the country; or when primary-school headteachers ask parents trying to enrol their children in a certain school known to be of good quality and/or in their neighbourhood to make a ‘voluntary’ donation, on grounds that the school is underfunded and money needs to be collected to cover its expenses; or, when people seek out friends/relatives in public institutions to ensure even the simplest task is done without getting tangled up in red tape, while simultaneously thinking this just a part of their socialisation. These and similar cases make it necessary to unpack the term corruption.

Unpacking Corruption - A Taxonomical Approach

The standard political economy literature defines corruption as the misuse of legislated power and position by public officers as well as political officials for illegitimate private gain.⁴ Corruption is then seen as threatening good governance, sustainable development and the democratic process, and as promoting injustice in society and business; it is thus conceived as a type of deviant behaviour.⁵

Although upstream and downstream corruption (sharing bribes with higher- and lower-ranked officials, respectively) is widespread, making it ever more difficult to contain the extent of corruption in public institutions, the umbrella framework used to capture the economic dimension of corruption is the principal-agent theory. Since most public institutions are organised hierarchically, the relationship between superiors (principals) and subordinates (agents) may become problematic under conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information: Agents, instead of working on tasks assigned by the principal, may well pursue their own interests and misuse their power or position in return for private benefits in cases where such behaviour is not easily observable.⁶ For instance, suppose the Minister of the Interior is keen on reducing traffic accidents and employs tools to this end (such as punishing speeding drivers), but what if traffic police see no harm in accepting bribes to overlook the transgression and not fine speeders? This is where the principal-agency problem emerges between the ministry and its officers. If it were the government accepting kickbacks from procurements, then the problem would be between the elected government and the constituency. The literature certainly provides remedies for both

kinds of cases, underlying the importance of incentive structures.⁷ For the first type, introducing properly - and intelligently - designed institutions, including 'incentive-compatible' mechanisms that align agents' interests with those of the principal, increasing audits and penalties, and introducing technology that will curb agents' discriminatory power may well work to halt corruption to a great extent, even if not fully. For the second type, promoting transparency and accountability and demanding commitment from political parties to combat corruption should produce similar outcomes.

Underlying this line of thinking is the fact that agents engaged in corruptive activities are indeed conscious of the deviant nature of their behaviour. The standard literature is therefore based on the assumption that agents make their own cost-benefit analyses before undertaking such activities. In the present attempt to taxonomically investigate the different manifestations of corruption, this type will certainly capture many cases and will be referred to as 'individualistic' corruption.

It is also true that in some circumstances, agents may enter corruptive activities without realising the wrongdoing dimension of their actions. Consider, for instance, public officers who extend favourable treatment to members of their network in an environment where many procedures are indeed conducted through such networks. If these officers perceive themselves, above all, as a member of their network rather than a member of society, and if such perceptions are indeed numerous in a given society, then such an action - which in fact contradicts the very basic neutrality requirement of the public sphere - would not be categorised in their minds as preferential treatment, thus illegitimate; at any rate, since money/gifts are not exchanged, it would be difficult to prove wrongdoing. Obviously, such officers are likely to be receiving similar favourable treatments from other members of their network, and they thus may reflect a kind of reciprocal relationship. However, the fact is that this reciprocity might be very indirect and realised within long-standing friendship and family/ethnic/clan/religious ties based on closeness and obligations. As largely discussed in the anthropology literature, in such environments it is conceivable that agents are not engaging in simple calculative conducts.⁸ This type of favouritism, where agents are unaware of the deviant aspect of their actions, will be labelled 'reciprocity' here. Increasing transparency and accountability at the

bureaucratic level and relying more on automated procedures in the relationship between citizens/firms and public institutions would certainly curb this type of corruption, although a more decisive solution would of course be a *gestalt* switch, so that public officers associate themselves not with narrowly defined networks but rather the general public.

The third category deals with situations arising from a collective-action problem that leads to the ready acceptance or internalisation of corruptive activities as legitimate, where wrongdoers lack a sense of guilt. In a country where informality is rampant due to systemic problems, not contributing to public goods by evading taxes or employing labour with no social security (and bribing officers to escape auditing) could easily become the default behaviour.

The crucial point in the presence of extensive informality is that in reality, informal firms simply legitimise their actions on the grounds that ‘everyone else evades taxes, or everyone else uses informal labour, so I do as well - otherwise I won’t be able to compete with these firms and eventually go bankrupt’. This third taxonomical category, labelled corruption due to ‘lack of participation’ here, obviously requires the existence of a large informal economy (thus a large body not contributing to the public sphere). Literature on the informal sector refers to a set of policies to reduce informality, such as making the formal sector more beneficial, building trust and collective incentives and increasing tax compliance. Yet, especially the policy-oriented literature points out that in cases where informality is certainly not a marginal issue, then piecemeal reforms may not work effectively and an overall systemic reform initiative may be required instead.

The fourth category of corruption arises in cases where local governments or local public institutions (such as schools, hospitals, kindergartens) utilise their power to extract (additional) money from service users so as to run their activities ‘properly’, claiming their initial budgets are insufficient to fully cover their expenses. Although the funds raised in implicit or explicit deals are claimed to be channelled to public use, this constitutes yet another manifestation of corruption since the funds are collected involuntarily and illicitly, most likely without reference to any principles (such as progressivity), and are not bound by the accountability rule. Here it is assumed that local institutions have an *a-priori* definition regarding the

quality/quantity of the service to be delivered (greater than what is currently available) and believe that service users can afford to pay such ‘additional’ taxes.⁹ There is obviously a clear connection between this category, labelled ‘forced donations’ and the third one, in the sense that informality reduces the size of the public (central government) budget, and hence puts financial pressure on individual public institutions. Furthermore, given that tax evasion is a serious issue, these institutions may well find it legitimate to demand extra taxes from the ‘captured’ service users.

Finally, the last category considers cases where the process of political clientelism, where politicians favour and look after the interests of people from their own party by ways of violating the neutrality principle, turns politics into a bargaining process between the voting public (the clients) and the politicians who protect them (the patrons).¹⁰ Labelled ‘clientelist corruption’, here one would expect to see people voting for political parties or politicians they perceive as providing them special favours, and politicians granting these favours with the expectation of re-election or other political gains. State employment based on service to a party rather than public interest; distribution of public services in return for political support rather than according to need and justice; public support to certain segments of the population in return for political support, ignoring the principle of productivity - all these are clear examples of clientelism. What is observed in such cases is particularistic networks between government bodies and interest groups - hence the term ‘patron–client’ relationship.

These five different categories, and inevitably their combinations, should provide a suitable setting to investigate the various manifestations of corruption. A detour is required at this point, to explain why this matter has been elaborated. The literature on corruption largely departs from the view that involved parties are indeed aware of the ‘wrongdoing’ aspect of their actions, as realised through the misuse of entrusted power by political leaders and/or public officials, and thus tends to analyse these actions as ‘exchange’ relations - some realised in a one-shot interaction, others extended to the long-term; some involving nothing but cash, others coming with their own, specific rituals - at the expense of public benefits. Here, however, it is explicitly acknowledged that, at the expense of social welfare, some mutually-beneficial

relations may possibly be perceived by their participants as being quite natural and within the spirit of societal and friendship bonds. A similar mentality of not feeling guilt is said to occur in cases where a serious informality problem exists, and evading taxes or employing informal labour, even resorting to bribery if necessary, may become the default behaviour. The taxonomical and, in our opinion, more complete, categorisation of corruption provided here will help in gauging the subject matter in its fuller manifestations. Next, the Turkish case is considered based on this categorisation, by employing results from field studies.

Different Manifestations of Corruption in Turkey

As framed above, ‘individualistic’ corruption can easily be dealt with through redesigning the institutional setting. It is a fact that some people are more opportunistic (and have lower moral values) than others, and would therefore engage in such manipulative activities if given the opportunity. Altering people’s moral values towards becoming a more responsible citizen should of course be the ultimate aim, yet this can only be achieved in the long-run. However, changing the ‘rules of the game’ by, for instance, increasing the probability of getting caught while engaging in corrupt actions, designing strategy-proof procedures that cannot be manipulated, making it less possible for officials to make arbitrary decisions and hence curtail their power to influence outcomes is certainly within the reach of governments. It is telling that in a nationwide survey representative of urban Turkey conducted in late 2008, as many as 26 percent of the respondents said if they were caught speeding (in a hypothetical setting), they would opt to bribe the officer or at least definitely consider it (Adaman *et al.* 2009). More interestingly, this figure has remained more or less unchanged over the last few years (it was 28 percent in 2004; see Adaman *et al.* 2005). Although the share of the population ready to resort to bribery has remained almost intact, people’s experiences with traffic police in real life are more telling. In both 2004 and 2008, people were asked (in the same surveys mentioned above) whether they actually made irregular payments (cash or in-kind) to various institutions in the last two years; responses revealed a very sharp decrease in payments to traffic police, from 20 percent to 8.8 percent. A new set of regulations

(e.g., installation of automated speed cameras) has decreased the level of arbitrary action by police officers, and this decline is explicable with changes in the rules of the game. The prevalence of bribery/embezzlement in public hospitals reveals a similar picture. The 2004 survey indicated that 4 percent of those who had visited public hospitals were asked to make irregular payments to be able to receive services; this figure went down to 1.7 percent in 2008 (Adaman *et al.* 2005, 2009). A very likely explanation for the decrease in the hospital setting is the recent reforms in the health care system, where many hospital procedures became automated, decreasing the leverage of health care personnel and thus opportunities for embezzlement. These two findings indicate that while the ratio of opportunistic people may not have altered much, incidences of corruption decreased between 2004 and 2008, providing clear evidence that institutional mechanisms can successfully combat the first category of corruption.

The second category, ‘reciprocity’, is reportedly quite prevalent in Turkey. The 2008 survey results revealed a very striking fact: when dealing with public institutions, 22.1 and 23.3 percent of the respondents said that the best way to conduct official business would be to find a friend/relative/acquaintance in a national or local government office, respectively. Although there is a slight decrease in these figures compared to the 1999 data as a result of increased automation of certain official procedures (from 26 and 31 percent, respectively), the prevailing high percentage is a clear indication of how the state-civil society relationship is being infiltrated by ‘reciprocal’ networks (Adaman *et al.* 2001, 2009).

Evidence suggests that the third category, or corruption ‘due to lack of participation’, is also quite common in Turkey as well. The 2008 survey delivered a noteworthy finding: 45 percent of the urban population said they agreed to make purchases without receipts, thus colluding with the shopkeeper against the VAT tax system (Adaman *et al.* 2009). This should not come as a surprise, given that Zenginobuz and Tokgöz (2010) computed that in 2008 in Turkey the VAT evasion rate was at 41 percent (calculated as the difference between the potential income tax people should normally pay - based on consumption figures revealed in a country-wide comprehensive household survey - and the actual amount of collected taxes). Similarly, informality has reached quite high levels in Turkey: its estimate is at

around 35 percent of the GDP (Schneider 2007), and 30 percent of the industrial labour force is known to be uninsured (TURKSTAT 2010). Informality and the third type of corruption may very well form a self-perpetuating system, as increased informality would make more people legitimise corruptive activities in their minds, and more corruption would mean a further increase in informality - and in such an environment, people would have no sense of illegitimacy if it comes to be that they have to bribe state officers so as to avoid being caught during auditing. Unless informality is addressed as a top-priority problem, and a long-term and comprehensive reform scheme is designed, curbing this type corruption in Turkey will remain difficult. Although Turkey has recently made an attempt in targeting informality (World Bank 2010), not much has been achieved so far.

The fourth category, 'forced donations', has clear links to the Turkish government's inability to collect taxes properly. As of 2008, Turkey's ratio of collected taxes to GDP was 24.5 percent, the smallest figure among OECD countries after Mexico - the EU-15's average being 38.7 percent (Zenginobuz *et al.* 2010). One likely consequence of this, as presented in the previous section, might be that local institutions feel the need to collect their own taxes to top up their budgets. There is abundant anecdotal evidence indicating that local governments request 'voluntary' donations - not cash, but in-kind donations, such as an air conditioner for the municipality building, four tyres for a road grader, an ambulance, *et cetera* - from citizens as a requisite to conclude their business. Although public institutions try to make it apparent that the donation will not be used for personal gains, the lack of transparency makes people feel the arbitrariness in the process.

The last category involves cases of favouritism as manifestations of 'patron-client' networks. A wide body of theoretical literature suggests, almost unanimously, that interaction between groups of people and the Turkish state is mostly being conducted through the use of patronage links.¹¹ Yet, unveiling these types of corruptive activities, and especially distinguishing between whether the patron-client relationship is based on explicit beneficial exchanges or long-term reciprocity with no explicit transactions, is no easy task. Again, diagnostic survey results may give some evidence. When asked, for example, about their perceived level of favouritism on a scale of 0 to 10 (0, 'full favouritism' and 10, 'no favouritism'), the respondents of the

2008 survey ranked most national and local governments' services (construction permits, inspections, auditing, tender bids, among others) around 4, suggesting the existence of patronage links. Similarly, when people were asked to reveal their perceptions as of how public jobs are filled, 44 and 54 percent of the respondents indicated that clientelism played a large role in recruitment to positions in the central government and municipalities, respectively. Although reasonable improvement from the 2000 figures is apparent for both cases, these findings still indicate the perception with regard to the existence of preferential treatment in the public sphere (Adaman *et al.* 2009).

Looking Forward

The discussion so far has shown that incidences of corruption in Turkey result from a variety of circumstances. These were taxonomically divided into five, and it was claimed that each category had a different set of causes. Needless to say, reality would most likely arise from hybrid cases. For instance, some of the money embezzled by a public office could also be used to improve the public service provided, or high school head teachers who collect 'voluntary donations' could put aside a portion of it for 'personal' necessities.

What matters is that some of these types of corruption can easily be targeted with improved institutional settings while others cannot, as there seem to be systemic problems deep-rooted in the state-society relationship. Therefore, any policy suggestions to fight corruption in Turkey should take this picture as a starting point, as otherwise it may prove difficult to comprehend why the Turkish state is achieving so little despite the hitherto erected and quite impressive legislative body. Making it possible to pay taxes online, thereby drastically reducing red tape and room for potential embezzlement (the first type of corruption) is one thing, minimising tax evasion and hence providing better public services, thus lessening the need public institutions to raise extra funds (the third and fourth types of corruption) is quite another. It was also observed that if the state-society relationship is largely configured along clientelistic lines, these are likely to appear in decisions taken in every area of the public sector and develop as part of political process (the fifth type). In their

relations with each other, all actors who play a role in this process are likely to act as parts of the corruption network, at different levels. Certainly, increased transparency and accountability at the state level, especially with regard to the financing of political parties and election campaigns, would help deal with patron-client networks, but presumably a more democratic environment, where civil society has a larger say in the political sphere, will be the proper cure. Finally, the question of how to achieve the *gestalt* switch that will make people (ordinary citizens as well as businessmen and politicians) move away from particularistic interests, where belonging to a network is valued highly (the third type), and begin to value the meaning of universal principles is certainly not an easy one, and requires proper enquiry on the state-society relationship, its past and its evolution.

Concerning the last dimension, it is safe to say that there exist unhealthy elements in the way the state-society relationship is construed. Let us again refer to the 2008 survey results (Adaman *et al.* 2009), where the respondents revealed a lack of trust in public bodies/institutions in general and dissatisfaction with the services provided. This clearly indicates that corruption problems are at least partially due to misgovernance and a stricture that exists between society and the state.

To conclude, let us reiterate that given this picture, it becomes clear that a full-scale anti-corruption strategy should include not only policing-type regulations and improved institutional structures (provided of course there is a political will in that regard), but also systemic reforms to deal with patron-client networking, informality and tax evasion. Once this is acknowledged, corruption in Turkey may be seen as more than a mere 'technical problem' that can be solved through increased public auditing and more intelligently-designed incentive structures that will curb corruptive behaviour. Since trust in public institutions is very low, it is rather difficult to speak of a healthy public sphere. There is a clear need, therefore, for a comprehensive reform of governance structures, in the form of increased accountability and transparency. Furthermore, when speaking of reforming the overall governance structure, there is also a question that needs to be asked regarding the political economy side of the problem: who is going to absorb the resistance from the beneficiaries of corruption, and in the case of large-scale reforms that will also incorporate more systemic issues, who will shoulder the cost?

Last but not least, let us return to our initial questions regarding the future of the EU-Turkey relationship within the context of corruption. As mentioned at the outset, there are two (somewhat related) questions that need to be answered: First, whether the corruption issue will be a constraint for Turkey in its efforts to join the EU, and second, how the negotiations with the EU will affect corruption in Turkey. Regarding the former, it is true that the EU is keen on fighting corruption, as Article 29 of the Treaty mentions preventing and combating corruption as one way to achieve the objective of creating and maintaining a European area of freedom, security and justice. Yet, in judging whether the corruption level in Turkey is comparable to countries that have already acceded, the picture is mixed (see, e.g., Michael 2004). According to Transparency International figures, although most member states have scores 7 or above on a 0-to-10 index and are therefore among the least corrupt countries in the world, the number of member states where corruption figures are worse than the figures for Turkey is not marginal either; for instance, Italy (an old member), Greece (a relatively newer one) and Bulgaria (a new one), all have worse scores than Turkey. Presumably though, Turkey will be unable to ask to be considered among ‘bad examples’ and the EU will likely press Turkey to combat corruption. Given the link between corruption and democracy (see, e.g., Warren 2006), the EU’s continued pressure on democracy and human rights in Turkey will certainly be of help in this regard, albeit mostly indirectly. Regarding the latter question, it was already observed that the EU’s engagement with corruption in Turkey seems to be focused on policing-type regulations and increasing coordination among public institutions charged with fighting corruption.

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¹ The ‘Economic Crime Division’ of the Council of Europe has been charged with implementing this project; see <www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/projects/TYEC/1062-TYEC-ProjectDocument-Sep07.PDF>.

² For a selection, see Adaman *et al.* 2001, 2003, 2005, 2009; Tarhan *et al.* 2005; Önder *et al.* 2008.

³ In passing, we acknowledge that cases of corruption covered in the media might be different from actual occurrences of corruption.

⁴ Although corruption may well occur in the private sphere, the scope of this paper only includes those in the public sphere.

⁵ For a theoretical discussion, see, e.g., Rose-Ackerman 1978, 2006; Klitgaard 1988. For an applied research study, see, e.g., Sayan 2009. We do not question here the moral aspect *per se*. What if a father

bribes the police to not torture his son charged with engaging in political activities in an undemocratic country?

⁶ See, e.g., Stiglitz 2008.

⁷ See, e.g., Acemoğlu *et al.* 2001.

⁸ See, e.g., Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984.

⁹ Motivations that underlie officials' reasons are not being pursued here.

¹⁰ See, e.g., Bhagwati 1982; Krueger 1994.

¹¹ See, e.g., Heper and Keyman 1998; Green 2005; Keyman 2005; Keyman and İçduygu 2005.

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