

Designing Matching Mechanisms for India with Comprehensive Affirmative Action Constraints

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Abstract

India has been implementing the most comprehensive affirmative action program in the world. Vertical (social) reservations are provided to the members of historically discriminated Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), Other Backward Classes (OBC), and Economically Weaker Section (EWS) of the General Category (GC). Horizontal reservations are provided for other disadvantaged groups, such as women and disabled, within each social category. The laws in India do not provide a well-defined procedure to implement horizontal reservations. Moreover, the sequential processes in use for reverting unfilled OBC seats to GC seats leads to severe shortcomings. To overcome all of these and other related issues, we design choice rules for institutions by taking meritocracy into account. We apply the theory developed in Aygün and Turhan (2019) to show that the cumulative offer mechanisms with respect to the institutional choice rules we design satisfactorily clear all these markets.